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Abstract
Background: We aimed to identify the indicators of healthcare fraud and abuse in general physicians’ drug 
prescription claims, and to identify a subset of general physicians that were more likely to have committed fraud 
and abuse.
Methods: We applied data mining approach to a major health insurance organization dataset of private sector 
general physicians’ prescription claims. It involved 5 steps: clarifying the nature of the problem and objectives, data 
preparation, indicator identification and selection, cluster analysis to identify suspect physicians, and discriminant 
analysis to assess the validity of the clustering approach. 
Results: Thirteen indicators were developed in total. Over half of the general physicians (54%) were ‘suspects’ of 
conducting abusive behavior. The results also identified 2% of physicians as suspects of fraud. Discriminant analysis 
suggested that the indicators demonstrated adequate performance in the detection of physicians who were suspect 
of perpetrating fraud (98%) and abuse (85%) in a new sample of data.
Conclusion: Our data mining approach will help health insurance organizations in low-and middle-income 
countries  (LMICs) in streamlining auditing approaches towards the suspect groups rather than routine auditing 
of all physicians. 
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Implications for policy makers
• A large proportion of the physicians are suspect of perpetrating abusive behavior and a small proportion (just over 2%) of physicians is suspect 
of conducting the fraudulent behaviors.
• Third-party payers in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) can improve auditing approaches towards the suspect groups rather than 
routine auditing of all physicians. 
Implications for public
Up to 10% of total health expenditure is wasted because of fraud and abuse, amounting to billions of dollars per year. Traditional methods of 
detecting healthcare fraud and abuse are based on auditing procedures that are often time-consuming and practically ineffective. Our research can 
help third-party payers such as health insurance organizations to extract useful knowledge from thousands of claims and identify a smaller subset 
of the claims or claimants for further assessment and scrutiny for fraud and abuse.
Key Messages 
Background
Healthcare expenditure is rapidly rising in many countries. 
Globally around 10% of the gross domestic product of the 
countries was spent on health in 2011.1 Unfortunately, not 
all of this money is spent in the right place. There are many 
sources of inefficiency. An important fraction of this money 
– up to 10% of total health expenditure – is wasted because 
of fraud and abuse, amounting to billions of dollars per year.2
Fraud has been defined as an intentional deception or 
misrepresentation made by a person or an entity, with the 
knowledge that the deception could result in some kinds 
of unauthorized benefits to that person or entity.3 The term 
‘‘abuse’’ may be used to describe problematic behavior of 
a physician or healthcare organization which is not clearly 
against the law or where certain elements of the fraud 
definition (such as knowing deception) are missing.4,5 Abuse 
is the closest concept to fraud and usually accompanies it. 
Nevertheless, fraud boundaries are confused with abuse and 
also to some extent with unprofessional behavior, negligence 
and corruption.5
Healthcare fraud can be classified into categories of provider 
fraud, consumer fraud (patient or insured), and insurer or 
payer fraud.6 Provider healthcare fraud may be committed 
by individuals (eg, physicians, dentists) or by provider 
organizations (eg, hospitals). Sometimes providers engage in 
fraudulent behaviors that involve other service providers (eg, 
diagnostic services) or pharmaceutical and medical device 
manufacturers by receiving kickback payments. Provider 
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related fraudulent behaviors may also involve other groups, 
eg, patients or insurer representatives.5,6 
Interventions to combat healthcare fraud and abuse can 
be classified into the 3 categories of interventions aimed at 
preventing, detecting, and responding to fraud and abuse.5 The 
focus of this paper is on the interventions designed to detect 
fraud and abuse in physician behavior. Such interventions 
involve identifying past and new cases of fraud as quickly as 
possible after a fraud has been committed. 
Traditional methods of detecting healthcare fraud and 
abuse are based on auditing procedures that are often time-
consuming and practically ineffective. Such paper-based 
claim handling is still the dominant picture in many low- 
and middle-income countries (LMICs).7,8 Often thousands 
of healthcare claims are handled by few auditors who are 
expected to review all the claims. In reality, they have little 
time for each claim, focusing on special characteristics of a 
claim without paying attention to the relationships between 
all the variables that provide a comprehensive picture of a 
physician behavior. 
Certain physician payment methods act as a risk factor for 
abuse, and perhaps fraud, in healthcare. Under fee-for-service 
payment systems where a third-party payer exists, physicians 
have motivation to increase the number of services.9 This 
might result in the provision of substandard care and 
unnecessary services that have been categorized as examples 
of abuse.5,10 If these payment mechanisms are accompanied 
with ineffective auditing procedures, which are frequently 
observed in LMICs, then health resource loss and potential 
harms to patients might be substantial.
Data mining, as a key part of ‘knowledge discovery from 
databases’ (KDD), involves the use of methods that explore 
the data, develop relevant models and discover previously 
unknown patterns in the data.11 Data mining can help third-
party payers such as health insurance organizations to extract 
useful knowledge from thousands of claims and identify a 
smaller subset of the claims or claimants for further assessment 
and scrutiny for fraud and abuse. This way, the data mining 
approaches are part of a more efficient and effective auditing 
system.12
Objectives
Our study aimed to demonstrate how data mining can be 
used in a real context of a health insurance organization in a 
middle-income country. We applied data mining approaches 
to general physician’s outpatient claims submitted to the 
Social Security Organization (SSO) in Iran. We aimed to 
identify indicators of healthcare fraud and abuse in general 
physicians’ drug prescription claims, and to identify a subset 
of general physicians that were more likely to have committed 
fraud and abuse. 
The paper is organized as the following. We first provide a brief 
review of the literature about previous published studies that 
applied data mining to detect fraud and abuse in healthcare. 
Then we explain the role of the SSO in purchasing healthcare 
services in Iran. In the methods section, we describe the 
setting and the 5 general steps we followed to perform the 
data mining processes. Finally, we demonstrate the findings, 
explain their implications and discuss the limitations and 
advantages of our methods. 
Review of Literature
Computerized systems that process pre-defined simple rules 
are increasingly implemented for identifying errors and 
inappropriate billings, such as erroneous or incomplete data 
input, duplicate claims and ineligible claims. These systems, 
as they rely on simple rules, may not have the capabilities of 
modeling abusive and fraudulent behavior.6 They are also 
often unsuccessful in detecting fraudulent claims that are 
backed up with expected documentations, and in detecting 
new patterns of fraud and abuse.
More sophisticated antifraud systems are based on combining 
statistical methods and machine learning and are generally 
known as KDD. They involve several steps starting from 
understanding the setting and environment, setting clear 
objectives, understanding the data and the nature of the 
claims, cleaning, preparation and transformation of the data, 
selecting appropriate data mining approaches, conducting 
data mining algorithms, and evaluation and interpretation of 
the findings.11 
Data mining techniques used in healthcare fraud detection 
are divided to 2 general approaches of ‘supervised’ and 
‘unsupervised’ methods.13 Supervised data mining usually 
involve methods that use samples of previously known 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent records. The records are 
then used to construct models which allow assigning a new 
observation into one of the 2 groups of records. Supervised 
methods require confidence in the correct categorization 
of the records. Furthermore, they are useful in detecting 
previously known patterns of fraud and abuse. Hence, the 
models should be regularly updated to reflect ‘innovations’ 
in fraudulent behaviors and changes in the regulations and 
settings. Liou et al14 used supervised methods to review 
claims submitted to Taiwan’s National Health Insurance for 
diabetic outpatient services. They compared 3 data mining 
methods including logistic regressions, neural networks, and 
classification trees for the detection of fraudulent or abusive 
behavior.13 As another example, one study used supervised 
data mining to see whether the providers followed the 
previously defined clinical pathways. They hypothesized that 
deviations from clinical pathways might be an indication of 
potential fraudulent or abusive behavior.15
In contrast, unsupervised approaches do not require a 
prior knowledge of fraudulent behavior. They often involve 
comparing individual claims with the norms observed in 
the sample of claims under analysis. Unsupervised methods 
typically include segmentation techniques (such as clustering 
methods and anomaly detection) and association rules 
mining methods.6,13 Some examples of applying unsupervised 
methods are presented below.8 One study applied clustering 
methods on general physician’s practice data of the national 
health insurance in Taiwan.16 They used ten indicators 
(features or attributes) to cluster physicians’ practice data. 
They ranked critical clusters using expert opinions about 
importance of clusters on health expenditures. Finally, they 
illustrated managerial guidance based on expert opinions 
about characteristics of each critical cluster.16 Another study 
applied a 2-phase model to identify abusive internal medicine 
outpatient’s clinics in Korea.17 This study gathered data from 
practitioner outpatient care claims submitted to a health 
insurance organization. They calculated a risk score by using 
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38 indicators indicating the degree of abuse likelihood of the 
providers, and then classified providers using a decision tree.17 
Shan et al18 applied a local density based outlier detection 
method on optometrists’ claims drawn from Medicare 
Australia. They validated the results based on the optometrists’ 
compliance history and feedback from experts.18 In another 
study, association rule mining was applied to examine billing 
patterns of a group of specialist physicians to detect potential 
fraudulent behaviors. They identified association rules from 
specialist billing records and the specialists whose claims 
frequently broke the rules were identified as potentially at 
high risk of fraud and abuse.19 
Applying supervised models requires knowledge of whether 
the claims are fraudulent or abusive or not in order to build the 
analytical models. Usually medical insurance organizations 
do not have such information about the individual claims. 
As another limitation of supervised methods, it is argued that 
as soon as fraudsters become aware of a particular detection 
method, they try adapting their strategies to avoid detection.20 
Unsupervised approaches, in theory, can be applied to 
identify new types of fraud or abuse which might not have 
been previously documented, and hence is relatively immune 
to both previous concerns.
There are also hybrid methods of combining unsupervised 
and supervised methods. As an example, one study conducted 
a 3 steps methodology for insurance fraud detection. They 
applied unsupervised clustering methods on insurance claims 
and developed a variety of (labeled) clusters. Then they used 
an algorithm based on a supervised classification tree and 
generated rules for the allocation of each record to clusters. 
Then they identified the most effective ‘rules’ for future 
identification of abusive behaviors.21
Methods
Setting
There are no estimates of fraud and abuse losses in Iran 
healthcare system.22 Still international evidence suggests that 
it would be an important fraction of healthcare costs. Iran 
has 3 major social health insurers: Iran Health Insurance 
Organization (formerly known as the Medical Services 
Insurance Organization), SSO and the Military Forces 
Social Security Organization. SSO implements a compulsory 
coverage of formal sector workers and their families, and 
a voluntary coverage for self-employed persons and their 
families. SSO covered over 33% of Iran population in 2010 
(about 25 million of Iran’s population).23 
SSO is financed by contributions of the insured, employer 
and the government, paying equivalent 7%, 20%, and 3% 
of the insured monthly salary, respectively. Exemptions 
and premium caps also apply. After the Ministry of Health 
(MoH), SSO is the second provider of treatment services 
with a network of 70 hospitals (about 9% of all hospitals) and 
about 280 clinics and polyclinics around the country.24 Thirty 
percent of SSO resources are allocated to theses centers.24 
The major part of SSO financial resources are allocated to 
purchasing curative services from private and governmental 
healthcare institutions based on a fee-for-service payment 
approach. In 2012, the SSO had contractual agreements 
with over 4500 clinics and health centers, 700 hospitals and 
27 000 physician and dentist practices.24 From April 2011 to 
March 2012, the SSO processed 324 million outpatient and 
3.4 million inpatients claims.24
Despite a huge amount of paper claims handled, and a large 
amount of money spent, for purchasing curative services 
by SSO and the other insurance organizations in Iran, 
the auditing system is mainly manual and retrospective. 
Auditors are expected to review all of the received claims, 
which practically is time consuming and ineffective. In 
2008, SSO started a new program to replacing paper claims 
with electronic claims. Para-clinic centers such as private 
pharmacies and laboratories deliver electronic claims to SSO. 
General physicians and specialists working in private offices 
still deliver paper claims to SSO. The growing use of electronic 
claims is an opportunity to apply data mining approaches for 
improving auditing procedures. 
Data
The data used for this study originate from the insured 
patients’ visits of the physicians and physicians’ drug 
prescriptions, as we describe here. An insured patient carries 
an insurance logbook with them when they visit a physician. 
The physician writes and signs the prescription orders, if 
needed, on a specified page of the logbook. Then the patient 
takes the signed ‘prescription’ to the pharmacy to be dispensed, 
and pays the coinsurance rate of about 30% of the prescription 
costs. The pharmacy submits the dispensed ‘prescription’ to 
the insurer for the reimbursement of the remaining 70% of 
the costs. These prescriptions are then collected by the insurer 
in computerized files. We received the computerized data of 
drug prescriptions from the SSO for this study. 
Design
We used data mining tasks to detect probable fraudulent and 
abusive behavior of general physicians working in solo private 
practices.
This study was conducted in 5 steps. The first step was to 
understand the nature of the problem and clarify the study 
objectives. The second step focused on the understanding 
and preparation of data and involved a large amount of work 
to prepare the data for data mining. In the third step, we 
identified and selected the indicators (features, attributes). 
In the forth step, we applied clustering methods to identify 
a critical cluster of physicians. Finally, in the fifth step, we 
applied discriminant analysis to build a predictive model for 
determining group membership of general physicians based 
on new data. We interpreted the results by using expert’s 
viewpoints and providing policy implications of the results. 
Step 1: Understanding the Nature of the Problem
Talking to health insurance managers, they were concerned 
with 2 types of healthcare fraud and abuse among general 
physicians that were particularly time-consuming to detect. 
The first behavior of concern was an abuse pattern: a physician 
might prescribe more medicines than needed, including 
injectable medicines, antibiotics, corticosteroids or expensive 
medicines, to keep the patients satisfied with the physician. 
This way the physician might attract more patients and 
indirectly increase their revenue. Also the physician might 
prescribe injectable medicines, and take a benefit from the 
injection service that might exist besides the physician office. 
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The second concern was about a fraudulent behavior that 
involved collusions between a physician and a pharmacy: 
The fraudster physician may remove blank prescription pages 
from the patient’s logbook, while the patient is unaware. This 
is usually additional to the genuine drug prescription order 
that is written in the logbook and handed over to the patient. 
Later on, the physician and the colluding pharmacy add 
(expensive) medicines to the blank page and produce a bogus 
prescription order. Then the pharmacy submits the bogus 
drug prescription claim to the insurer for reimbursements 
and splits the fraud money with the colluding physician. 
Step 2: Understanding the Data and Data Preparation
We collected data on the provincial branch of the SSO in 
the Lorestan province, Iran that contracted 454 general 
physicians, specialists and dentists and 283 para-clinic centers 
(eg, pharmacies, laboratories, x-rays, physiotherapy offices, 
and so on in private sector).24 The SSO covered about 26% of 
the Lorestan population (over 450 000 people).23 
We collected claim data on all contracted general physicians 
(ie, 205 general physicians) that included 612 804 outpatient 
drug prescription claims in year 2011. We also collected 
summary physician activities and specification data, and 
cross-checked the summary reports with the prescription 
details to ensure data completeness. Examples of available 
data about physicians and claims are provided in Table 1 and 
Table 2.
We linked physician data and claim data using unique 
physician codes. Instead of “claims,” we selected “physicians” 
as the unit of analysis as we were interested in identifying 
physicians that were suspicious of conducting fraud or abuse. 
Physician behavior in the public sector, where there is less 
incentive for fraud and abuse due to a lack of personal gain, 
Table 1. Examples of Physician Raw Data Based on Provided Data by 
SSO Local Branch in Lorestan Province, Iran
Physician Identifier 1 2
Gender Male Female
City or district Khoram abad Doroud
Number of months claims delivered 12 11
Number of visit claims (yearly) 12 000 4152
Total annual costs of visit claims 268 100 000 93 336 600
Number of prescription drug claims 13 450 3607
Total annual cost of prescription claims 320 125 727 68 724 149
Abbreviation: SSo, Social Security Organization.
Table 2. Examples of Physicians’ Prescribing Claim Raw Data Based on Provided Data by the SSO on Lorestan Province, Iran
Drug Prescription Identifier 123456 123456 123456 123456 123457 123457
Pharmacy identifier 35 35 35 35 87 87
Month of the year 5 5 5 5 11 11
Physician identifier 1 1 1 1 5 5
Patient logbook identifier 1234567890 1234567890 1234567890 1234567890 9876543210 9876543210
number of prescription items in a claim 4 4 4 4 2 2
Total cost of a claim 437000 437000 437000 437000 23000 23000
Code of individual drug on the prescription 10 958 400 525 80001 82950
Number of drugs requested 20 1 1 1 1 1
The cost of the individual drug 14500 16500 12000 7000 8000 15000
Abbreviation: SSo, Social Security Organization.
might be different with their behavior in the private sector. 
We identified and omitted 40 physicians from the analyses 
as they worked in private and public sectors simultaneously, 
and omitted 1 physician because of lack of data. We organized 
the data in 2 datasets. One included physician level variables 
and indicators on 164 general physicians (Table 1). The 
second dataset included 474 897 drug prescription claims 
(Table 2). Other data preparation tasks included finding and 
correcting errors, managing missing values, restructuring 
the data (for example restructuring tabular data to a 
transactional structure), computing and recoding variables 
and anonymizing physicians’ personal data. Patient’s age and 
gender were also omitted from the datasets because of a high 
percentage of missing values.
As fraud detection is about finding outliers and extreme cases, 
we did not omit or manipulate outliers or extremes. When we 
observed unusual cases, we investigated the case separately. 
We did not use statistical methods to manage missing values. 
If a variable or record had too many missing value, we omitted 
the variable or record. 
Step 3: Indicators (Features) Creation and Selection
The fundamental logic of applying statistical methods and 
data mining for detecting fraud and abuse in healthcare claims 
is that fraudulent behavior of physicians leaves footprints. 
The success of data mining process is dependent on the 
creation and selection of indicators (features or attributes) 
representing the symptoms of fraud and abuse in claims. 
Distinguishing reliable bits of information from “fool’s gold” 
depends on selecting appropriate indicators based on a good 
understanding of the context.
The indicators were created following a logical inference 
about fraudulent behavior of physicians and were validated 
by expert interviews. “Logical inference” referred to question 
like that: if a physician wants to behave fraudulently and 
submit false claim to SSO, what he most likely do? We 
considered all possible ways and discussed them with experts. 
See an example of such an inference in Box 1. We conducted 
interviews with 15 individuals including claim auditors (8 
interviewees), managers (5 interviewees) and physicians (2 
interviewees) at the provincial and national levels of SSO for 
validating the indicators. All of the interviewees had at least 
ten years related work experience. All managers were also 
general physicians. At the same time, we selected indicators 
from similar studies.7,14
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Step 4: Clustering 
We selected 92% of claims (436 622 claims) covering 11 
months of the study year. We calculated the indicators’ values 
for each physician and standardized indicators values using 
Z scores. We then used a hierarchical clustering method to 
segment physicians and identifying clusters of physicians 
that were suspect for abuse and fraud. The analysis involved 
the calculation of the distance between the data points and 
clusters (Euclidian distance measures). The optimal number 
of clusters was determined using the maximum value of 
the silhouette coefficient (a clustering validity index).16 In 
this process, the optimum number of clusters is established 
based on the maximum value of the silhouette coefficient. 
The data points were clustered so that the physicians within 
a cluster tended to be similar to each other, but dissimilar to 
Box 1. An example of a “logical inference” to identify the 
potential patterns of fraudulent behaviors 
“A physician might collide with a pharmacy in fraudulent 
behavior. The physician might obtain an empty page of a 
patient’s insurance logbook, fill it in with prescription that 
will not be dispensed by the pharmacy, and the pharmacy 
would claim such a fraudulent prescription from the 
insurer. One would expect such collisions will involve 
a link between the doctor and few pharmacies to reduce 
the chances of identification. Hence, repeated dispensing 
patterns will be of interest. Also it might involve prescribing 
more expensive medicines. Additionally the fraudster 
would try to reduce their chances of being identified. For 
example they might ensure that such prescriptions include 
no more than 3 medicinal items, as insurance organizations 
are more likely to assess a prescription that includes 4 or 
more items….”
the physicians in other clusters. In this process, we did not 
have a pre-determined number of clusters or a target group 
of physicians. Rather the data was used to identify the clusters 
and potential suspect groups (ie, unsupervised approach). 
As a result of the clustering process, the indicators that did 
not contribute to the clustering were omitted. Then steps 3 
and 4 were repeated until the outputs of the clustering were 
satisfactory. The complete list of the remaining indicators is 
in Table 3. Nine indicators of abuse and 5 indicators of fraud 
generated the optimal clustering results (one indicator was 
used both for fraud and abuse detection).
Step 5: Discriminant Analysis
As a result of physician clustering on 11 months of data, we 
had 2 clusters and thus we labeled them as healthy or suspect 
(of fraud or abuse). We labeled the clusters based on the 
characteristics (ie, calculated indicators) of the each clusters. 
We then applied discriminant analysis on the remaining 
section of data to assess whether the identified sets of 
indicators result in similar categorizations of physicians into 
suspects and healthy. The discriminant analysis was applied 
on the data from the 12th month of the study year (about 8% 
of physician claims). The analysis was based on developing 
linear combinations of the predictor variables (indicators) 
that provide the best discrimination between the clusters.25 
Results
Thirteen indicators were developed in total. Two indicators 
were related to cost issues, 4 indicators were related to the 
frequency and patterns of visits, and 7 indicators were related 
to prescription patterns. The analyses suggested that most 
indicators were either useful for fraud detection (4 indicators) 
or abuse detection (8 indicators). Only 1 indicator (‘the 
average cost of a drug prescription claim’) was shared in the 
detection of abuse and fraud (Table 3). In all of the indicators, 
the higher value of the indicator means the more possibility of 
abusive or fraudulent behavior.
Table 3. The Indicators and the Statistics of Selecting the Clusters Indicating the Physicians Who Were Suspect of Perpetrating Abuse or Fraud
Indicator Mean SD Mean SD
Abuse detection
Cluster 1 – 46%
(75 physicians)
Cluster 2 – 54%
(89 physicians)a
Percentage of the patients that they were visited more than once in a month 16.20 5.46 21.72 11.20
The average of the prescript drug items in a claim 3.54 0.57 4.66 0.57
The average cost of a drug prescription claimb 23 827 5398 29 668 5662
The ratio of the 5 expensive antibiotic prescription to all physician claims 0.25 0.11 0.39 0.17
The ratio of injection prescription to all physician claim 0.81 0.30 1.53 0.42
The ratio of total injection prescription to all physician claim 1.55 0.74 2.92 0.83
The ratio of total prescript antibiotic to all physician claims 0.68 0.18 1.06 0.19
The ratio of injected antibiotic to physician claim 0.19 0.11 0.44 0.15
The ratio of injected corticosteroid prescription to all physician claim 0.26 0.13 0.48 0.19
Fraud detection
Cluster 1 – 98%
(160 physicians)
Cluster 2 – 2%
(4 physicians)a
Percentage of reduplicative patients 30.05 10.58 41.87 15.23
Percentage of reduplicative patients-pharmacy 22.92 10.43 37.49 18.28
Percentage of reduplicative patients-pharmacy in a month 5.70 3.19 10.09 4.88
The average cost of a drug prescription claimb 26 656 5902 40 613 4756
The ratio of claims referred to a high-cost pharmacy 0.08 0.24 4.16 1.16
a Cluster 2 indicates the suspect group.
b This indicator has been used in the detection of fraud and abuse. 
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Abuse Detection
Nine indicators were used in identifying a critical cluster of 
physicians that were suspect of perpetrating abuse (Table 
3). The silhouette coefficients values were equivalent to 0.50 
in the 2 clusters, suggesting fair clustering efficiency.16 The 
physicians in cluster 2 were more likely to perpetrate abusive 
behavior (suspect group). The analysis suggested that just 
over half of the general physicians (54%) in the province were 
suspect of conducting abusive behavior, featured mainly as 
prescription patterns that did not follow the agreed standards. 
Physicians in the suspect group were more likely to prescribe 
more medicines and injectables per prescription, and on 
average their prescription claims were about 25% more 
expensive. 
We then applied the discriminant analysis on the remaining 
data (one month data). It showed that over 84.75% of the 
cases remained in the same healthy or suspect category that 
they had been assigned to (Table 4).
Fraud detection
We used 5 indicators for the detection of fraudulent behavior. 
The fraud behavior of interest in this study involved collusion 
between physicians and pharmacies. The indicators used for 
fraud detection included 4 indicators linked to physician 
behavior (mainly related to the visit patterns). We also defined 
a pharmacy related indicator. We classified pharmacies to 3 
categories of low, medium, and high-cost pharmacies based 
on the average cost of general physicians prescription claims 
delivered by the pharmacy. It was likely that the physicians 
who were suspect of fraud would collude with a high-cost 
pharmacy. 
The analysis categorized the physicians into 2 clusters. 
Physicians in cluster 2 (suspect group) were more likely to 
have patients ‘visiting’ them more than once in a short period 
of time, and have dispensed their prescriptions at a particular 
pharmacy. Suspect physicians were about 50 times more likely 
to have their prescriptions dispensed in a high-cost pharmacy 
and the average cost of their prescriptions was substantially 
(about 60%) higher compared with other physicians (Table 3). 
The silhouette coefficient values reached a maximum of 0.70 
in 2 clusters, suggesting a good clustering efficiency.16 Four 
physicians were identified as suspect of fraud; all of them had 
also been identified as suspects for abusive behavior in the 
abuse detection analyses. 
We then applied discriminant analysis on the remaining one 
month data that showed 98.17% (161 out of 164) of original 
clustered cases were correctly classified (Table 4). All but 
Table 4. Results of Applying Discriminant Analysis on One Month Data for 
Detecting Suspected Physicians Perpetrated Abuse
Abuse Detection
Clusters
Predicted Group Membership
Total
1 2
Original
1 63 (84.00%) 12 (16.00%) 75 (100%)
2 13 (14.60%) 76 (85.39%) 89 (100%)
Fraud Detection
Clusters
Predicted Group Membership
Total
1 2
Original
1 159 (99.37%) 1 (0.62%) 160 (100%)
2 2 (50.00%) 2 (50.00%) 4 (100%)
one of the physicians that had been categorized in cluster 1, 
remained in the same cluster in the discriminant analysis. 
Two suspect physicians that had been identified as ‘suspect’ 
in clustering analysis moved to cluster 1 in the discriminant 
analysis.
Discussion 
We clustered physicians using 13 extracted indicators and 
identified suspect groups of physicians for conducting fraud 
and abuse. The results of the discriminant analysis suggested 
that the indicators demonstrated adequate performance in 
the detection of physicians who were suspect of perpetrating 
fraud and abuse in a new sample of data. 
The analyses identified a large proportion of the physicians 
as suspect of abusive behavior. This is in line with previous 
studies in Iran that demonstrated a high likelihood of 
‘irrational’ prescribing (eg, the proportion of prescriptions 
that include injectable medicines).26 The ‘irrational’ behavior 
of referring patients for ambulatory injections (for example 
corticosteroids),27 can also be linked with physicians’ own 
gain via provision of an adjacent injection service. Hence 
the indicators were less discriminatory in identifying the 
physicians who were suspect of abusive behavior from those 
with a lower quality prescribing behavior. As such, it might 
be more efficient for insurance organizations to invest their 
efforts on provider behavior change interventions, such 
audit and feedback and effective continuous education 
interventions,27,28 rather than auditing claims for abuse. Such 
interventions would have the added benefits of reducing 
abusive behavior as well as potentially improving patient 
outcomes. 
The results also identified a small proportion (just over 2%) of 
physicians as suspects of conducting the fraudulent behaviors 
of interest. This is similar to the findings of a study conducted 
in Esfahan province of Iran in 2012. They assessed a sample 
of physicians and used the auditor’s reports as an indicator 
of fraud. The study concluded that about 2.5% of general 
physicians had committed the fraudulent behavior of interest 
in our study (ie, “removing blank prescription pages from the 
patient’s logbook while the patient is unaware”).29 The results 
of our study can be helpful to the insurance organizations in 
streamlining their auditing approaches towards the suspect 
groups. 
The greater proportion of physicians as suspects of abusive 
behavior may indicate that the potential losses because of 
abuse might be much greater than what occurred because of 
fraud. Inefficient supervision of physicians and pharmacies in 
the private sector could result in prevailing abusive behavior 
and substandard care. 
Using a data mining approach as routine practice by health 
insurance organizations in Iran may require a restructuring of 
the information systems.30 Some essential data for detecting 
fraud and abuse may not be adequately recorded in databases. 
For example, geographical address of physician office and 
pharmacies were not available in the database, so we could not 
use the physician office-pharmacy distance as an indicator in 
detecting fraud. Another problem in the data was linked with 
the prevalent nature of dual (public and private) practice by 
physicians in Iran. The routine databases did not objectively 
record this, and we conducted several checks in order to 
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identify physicians with a significant presence in the public 
sector among our sample of private sector physicians. Dual 
practice is common among physicians in LMICs31 and other 
countries might face a similar limitation while applying data 
mining for fraud and abuse detection. 
If data exists, the addition of patients’ age, gender and primary 
diagnosis of disease can improve the performance of data 
mining in targeting certain subgroups of patients. Studies 
in Turkey and Taiwan used disease-treatment combinations 
as an indicator for identifying disease related fraudulent 
behaviors.7,15 A proper linkage between the insured population 
registration database and the physician and pharmacy service 
databases could result in better claim handling and provide 
further avenues in using data mining for fraud and abuse 
detection in insurance organizations. Method of our study 
was similar to method that used by a study in Taiwan.16 They 
used 10 indicators to cluster physicians’ practice data. But the 
number of clusters (10 clusters) was determined by experts. 
They used a 2-stage unsupervised learning methods including 
self-organized map and principle compound analysis to 
compress the number of optimal clusters and identifying the 
critical clusters.16 
In a country with more than one major insurer, the 
segmentation of the insurance markets might act as an 
obstacle to detect fraud and abuse. As a limitation of our 
study, we only focused on claims submitted to the SSO. Future 
studies should try analyzing the claims submitted to both 
major insurers in Iran simultaneously. A combined analysis 
of claims might be valuable for detecting certain abusive 
behaviors such as not spending enough time with each 
patient. A physician might try profiteering from allocating 
short visit times to each patient, which would also result in 
substandard prescribing approaches. 
Our findings are dependent on the indicators selected and 
used for the analysis. It is obvious that if we had selected a 
different set of indicators (eg, for other behaviors of interest) 
the suspect groups of physicians might have been different. 
As an advantage of our study, we selected “physician” as the 
unit of analysis, instead of claims. This was important as the 
data mining approaches are intended to be used for targeting 
auditing practices. Also analyzing physician claims results in 
a substantial reduction in the volume of data handled in each 
analysis. This will make data mining more manageable using 
personal computers, and hence more likely to be implemented 
in low-resource settings of provincial and district level offices 
of the insurance organizations.
In our study, we tried to conduct association rule mining to 
extract data-driven indicators based on methods that Shan 
et al19 proposed and we explained earlier in the paper. We 
wanted to create a number of breaking rules as indicators 
for clustering (labeling) general physicians. However, we did 
not identify suitable breaking rules for clustering physicians. 
This might have occurred because of a substantial variation 
in prescribing behavior of the general physicians. Association 
rule mining might be more useful for disease related data 
mining analyses (eg, for detecting fraud in the management 
of a chronic disease) and should be assessed in future studies.
Conclusion
The analyses identified a large proportion of the physicians 
as suspect of abusive behavior. The results also identified a 
small proportion (just over 2%) of physicians as suspects of 
conducting the fraudulent behaviors of interest. Our approach 
will help the insurance organizations to focus their limited 
resources for combating potential frauds on the limited 
number of physicians with suspicious behavior, and use the 
results of detailed assessments to decide about the required 
further actions. 
Our data mining approach will help health insurance 
organizations in LMICs in streamlining auditing approaches 
towards the suspect groups rather than routine auditing of all 
physicians. 
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